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The decline of Employers’ Associations in the UK, 1976 to 2014  
 
Abstract 
 
This article examines the collective, member-based Employers’ Associations (EAs) in the UK 
that regulate the employment relationship by participating in collective bargaining. The main 
empirical contribution is to provide, for the first time, a longitudinal dataset of EAs in the UK. 
We use archival data from the UK Government’s Certification Office to build a new dataset, 
identifying a decline of 81 per cent in the number of EAs between 1976 and 2013-2014. We 
also find that political agency and reducing levels of collective bargaining undermined EAs by 
reducing employers’ incentives to associate, although changes within the UK’s system of 
employment relations enabled other types of collective employer organisation to survive. 
 
Keywords: employers’ associations, collective bargaining, economic governance, 
employment relations, collective action. 
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Introduction 
 
Employer Associations (EAs) are collective bodies in the UK that focus on the role of 
businesses as employers. Their primary activity over the period examined by this article was 
to represent employers’ labour market interests within collective bargaining, although they 
often offered other services linked to employers’ product market interests. The organisations 
that we examine in this article therefore were a combination of ‘pure’ EAs (Traxler, 2000) that 
focused only on employers’ labour market interests through collective bargaining, and ‘mixed’ 
organisations that focused on both employers’ labour and product market interests. We do not 
consider collective bodies that focused solely on employers’ product market interests, often 
described as trade associations.  
 
The main contribution of this article is to provide, for the first time in the literature, a 
longitudinal dataset of EAs in the UK that illustrates their changing fortunes. The other 
contribution is to explore factors that drove these changing fortunes. Both contributions draw 
on two datasets. The first is sourced from data collected by the Government’s Certification 
Office (CO) between 1976 and 2013-14, with these being collated to form a longitudinal 
dataset. The other dataset is our interviews with 98 representatives of collective employers’ 
organisations and linked bodies such as trade unions and governments. Interviews were 
conducted between 2013 and 2017 as part of a broader project on employers’ organisations in 
the UK (Gooberman et al, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d), and interviewees often had detailed 
historical knowledge of the changing landscape of collective organisation. 
 
The main contribution includes our finding that the number of EAs in the UK fell from 514 in 
1976 to 97 in 2013-2014, a decline of 81 per cent. Over the same period the combined employer 
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membership of EAs fell from 210,615 to 93,585, a decline of 56 per cent. Data are available 
on 160 EAs removed from the CO’s lists of such organisations, of which 126 (79 per cent) 
were either dissolved or could no longer be considered as EAs, with 34 (21 per cent) merging. 
Another marked change was a shift in the industry composition of EAs. In 1979, EAs 
representing employers in manufacturing dominated the list, accounting for 50 per cent of the 
total but by 2013-14 this figure had more than halved to 22 per cent. 
 
In the absence of a comprehensive UK literature on EAs, the article’s other contribution draws 
on the international literature (e.g.: Traxler, 2000; Behrens and Traxler 2004; Sheldon and 
Thornthwaite, 2004; Sheldon et. al. 2016) to propose two factors that could explain EAs’ 
declining incidence; structural economic change and reducing levels of collective bargaining. 
We also draw on the literature examining the UK’s changing system of employment relations 
(Howell, 2005; Baccaro and Howell, 2011) to propose a third factor; political agency. We find 
that EAs were inadvertent victims of state-driven changes to the UK’s political economy. The 
decline of collective bargaining and the closure of tripartite bodies that regulated aspects of the 
labour market reduced employers’ incentives to associate within EAs. Despite EAs’ decline, 
the growing volume of legislation around individual employment relationships enabled 
collective action to continue, albeit often in a different form to that of EAs.  
 
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. The next section examines the literature 
in relation to EAs, identifying factors that influenced their overall trajectory. We then outline 
our methods and data, before the subsequent section sets out our empirical findings. The article 
then explores potential explanatory factors, assessing the extent to which these explain our 
empirical findings. Subsequent sections discuss recent developments in employer collective 
organisation, before concluding. 
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Changes within collective bargaining and employer representation 
 
Despite the once important status of EAs in the UK, analyses of their declining incidence as a 
group do not exist. Studies have instead concentrated on individual organisations such as the 
Engineering Employment Federation (Joyce, 2013; McKinlay, 2011) and the Confederation of 
British Industry (Ingram and Lindop, 2011). While official data collected by the governments’ 
Certification Office are available, these have yet to be fully collated and examined. Finally, 
other official data on EAs are conspicuous by their absence. For example, the most prominent 
post-war official investigation into employment relations was the Royal Commission on Trade 
Unions and Employers’ Associations (known as the Donovan Commission) (HMSO, 1969). 
However, the Commission’s research did not survey all EAs, instead focusing on a small 
number of manufacturing employer bodies. 
 
While comprehensive studies of all EAs are absent from the UK’s employment relations 
literature, the declining incidence of collective bargaining is a central theme (e.g. Marginson, 
2015; Brown et. al., 2009). Analyses have highlighted how employment relations transformed 
from a collectivised approach characterised by collective bargaining, to a more firm-based 
focus as regulation of the individual employment relationship intensified. Dickens and Neal 
(2006a) summed up the change as follows: examining the list of bargaining arrangements that 
existed in 1980 was ‘like reading the names in a war memorial’. Examinations of the factors 
driving what Purcell (1995) identified as the end of institutional industrial relations focus on 
the key role played by the governments of Margaret Thatcher and her successors after 1979 
(e.g.: Howell, 2005; Baccaro and Howell, 2011). 
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While the totality of EAs in the UK is a neglected topic, international studies have analysed 
the changing patterns of employer collective action in mature economies. These studies have 
examined either a number of countries or have adopted a country-specific focus. 
  
In relation to multi-country studies, Traxler (2000) noted that two economic factors impacted 
the density of EAs across Europe. The first was how increasing openness to international trade 
undermined the attractiveness of nationally focused EAs to current and potential members. The 
other factor was linked to the shift towards a service sector led economy making recruitment 
harder, as service sector companies were less likely to associate. Traxler (2000) also noted how 
more collective approaches to employment relations incentivised greater levels of membership 
of EAs, as multi-employer bargaining structures helped manage union influence and prevent 
whipsawing against individual employers (Hauptmeier, 2011). Behrens and Traxler (2004) 
linked the diminishing incidence of collective action in some countries to the increasing role 
of individual companies within employment relations. Some EAs, such as national peak 
federations, adjusted by replacing collective bargaining with other forms of interest 
representation as their primary activity. However, EAs showed limited organisational change 
in other countries where collective approaches to employment organisations continued.  
 
Studies with a country-specific focus include Sheldon and Thornthwaite’s (2004) examination 
of four EAs in Australia and their responses to bargaining decentralization. They report that 
three EAs were active in sectors where decentralization was accompanied by weakening union 
influence, and these organisations increasingly offered business oriented services to their 
members. The fourth EA was active in a sector where trade unions remained powerful and 
retained a focus on collective labour market issues. Silvia and Schroeder (2007) argued that 
manufacturing EAs in Germany have lost members due to economic change, despite the 
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continued existence of collective bargaining structures. Increased levels of global competition 
disproportionately affected small companies specialising in component manufacture, but 
benefited larger firms assembling manufactured goods. Small suppliers sought to reduce costs 
and left EAs to develop company-specific arrangements by the late 1980s. Membership loss 
was also driven by changing business demographics featuring a greater number of smaller 
companies, which are less likely to associate. EAs responded ‘in the way that any business 
would respond to declining sales. They altered their existing product to bring it more in line 
with perceived customer needs and have been developing new offerings’ (Silvia and Schroeder, 
2007: 1451). Finally and most recently, Sheldon et al. (2016) examined responses to change 
within Australia and Italy across eight EAs. Three factors driving change were identified. The 
most important and overarching factor was decentralization within the structure of industrial 
relations, with the locus of decision-making increasingly transferred to the individual 
enterprise. The second factor was the retention of union strength in some sectors. The third was 
product market competition, where business services provided by EAs were also available from 
commercial organisations as well as via in-house expertise within larger companies. 
 
All these accounts have differing foci, but tend to identify factors within two broad domains; 
economic and institutional. Economic factors generally feature the impact of increased global 
competition and its structural impact. Institutional factors relate to changes within employment 
relations, centred on bargaining decentralisation and associated aspects such as the reducing 
salience of trade unions. While there is consensus as to the importance of these factors, their 
components and relative importance inevitably varies between countries. Crucially, the 
difficulty of accessing data on EAs sufficient to disentangle and quantify the importance of 
factors was highlighted with, for example, Traxler (2000) noting the sparseness of such data 
(2000, 308). 
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In the absence of a UK literature on EAs, we draw on the international literature on collective 
employer action to propose two explanatory factors for the declining incidence of EAs; 
structural economic change and declining levels of collective bargaining. We also draw on the 
literature on the UK’s changing system of employment relations (Howell, 2005; Baccaro and 
Howell, 2011) to propose a third; political agency.  
 
However, accurately quantifying the impact of each factor on the continued incidence of EAs 
is impractical. The extensive literature on the decline of UK trade unions after 1979 highlights 
the difficulty of identifying and quantifying factors causing institutional decline within 
employment relations. There are three conflicting accounts, which respectively prioritize 
changes to the structural environment across economic, political or social factors (e.g. Freeman 
and Pelletier, 1990), failures within unions (e.g., Kelly and Heery, 1989) and hybrid accounts 
that combine elements of the other two (e.g., Pencavel, 2003). While there is no consensus as 
to why unions declined, there is agreement as to its multi-faceted nature and the difficulties of 
disentangling and quantifying causal factors (e.g., Charlwood, 2013). As a result of such 
difficulties, we present an exploratory account that quantifies EAs’ decline before examining 
links between our empirical findings and explanatory factors.  
 
Methods 
 
We use two data sources to explore the decline of EAs in the UK. The first were sourced from 
the CO (Certification Office) and form the empirical core of this article. The CO was founded 
in 1974 as an independent statutory authority to determine trade union independence. It 
maintained lists of registered trade unions and EAs, with both classified as an organisation of 
‘workers or employers which has the regulation of relations between workers and employers 
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as one of its principal aims’ (CO, 1976, 3). In practice, this meant that only EAs active in 
collective bargaining were included. Each registered EA within Great Britain (Northern Ireland 
was excluded) was required to submit an annual return, containing data on its officers, numbers 
of employer members and finances. However, registration was voluntary and no advantages 
existed for EAs who did so (CO, 1990, 7). This means that registered lists are incomplete, with 
the CO stating (2000, 11) that ‘it is difficult to say precisely how many [EAs] are in existence.’ 
The CO addressed this lack of completeness through producing a parallel list of unregistered 
bodies that it believed met its definition of EAs.  
 
CO data fell into four categories. First, the CO’s annual reports provided data on the number 
and combined membership of all registered and unregistered EAs. Second, the reports also 
contained limited data, such as membership totals, on each of the largest listed and unlisted 
EAs. These were defined as those that exceeded annual income thresholds. Third, archival data 
are available at the UK Government’s National Archives. Between 1976 and 2013-14, 280 EAs 
were registered at the CO. Paper files containing annual returns exist on 165, although data 
after 2000 are very limited. Finally, the CO’s website includes the last three years’ returns for 
all registered EAs. We examined each paper file and manually transcribed data, before 
combining these with internet data to create our longitudinal dataset.  
 
The strength of these data is that they provide the only longitudinal data on EAs in the UK. 
While some commercial directories of business related organisations exist, each uses differing 
methodologies for data collection, conflate organisations representing employers with those 
representing individuals and are not available on a consistent basis over time. At the same time, 
some limitations exist within CO data. For example, literature on unions often use density data, 
based on the workforce proportion of members. These can be calculated through combining 
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membership data available from the CO with those on workforce size. However, CO data on 
EA membership relates only to the number of employer members and not to the numbers of 
people employed. Employment densities cannot be calculated, with density measures in the 
literature (Traxler, 2000; Behrens and Traxler, 2004) relating only to the estimated density of 
peak organisations. Finally, our membership analyses exclude data on the National Farmers’ 
Union (NFU) and the Scottish NFU. In 1976, their combined membership accounted for 42 
percent of all EAs, increasing to 52 per cent by 2013-14. They have a disproportionate 
'flooding' impact and are excluded.  
 
Our second data source is drawn from our project examining contemporary employer 
organisations in the UK (Gooberman et al., 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d; Heery et al, 2017), 
of which 13 per cent conduct collective bargaining. We carried out 98 interviews with 
collective employers’ organisations and linked bodies such as trade unions and governments. 
Interviews focused on the activities and governance of employer collective bodies and were 
carried out between 2013 and 2017. Interviewees were selected to represent a cross section of 
industrial sectors and organisational types. Interviews were semi-structured and aimed to shed 
light on activities and evolution of each body, while each was recorded and transcribed. We 
found that that many interviewees had historical knowledge of the changing landscape of 
collective employer organisation. As a result, the interviews were particularly useful in 
outlining how collective employer bodies reacted to changes to the UK’s system of 
employment relations over recent decades.  
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Quantifying decline 
 
Overall EA numbers 
 
The earliest years of the CO were characterised by difficulties in establishing how many EAs 
existed. These difficulties spurred a ‘process of pruning’ (1977, 4) that removed trade 
associations (employer collective bodies that did not bargain collectively) from the list of 
unregistered EAs, contributing to a rapid decline in the late 1970s (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Number of EAs listed by the CO, 1976 to 2013-14 (a-b). 
 
Notes: 
(a) Sudden increase in unregistered EAs in 1979 due to an unspecified ‘overhaul’ of these data in that year by 
the CO, according to its Annual Report (1979: 4).  
(b) In 1999, the CO switched from collating data by calendar year to financial year. 
Source: CO annual reports (various editions), authors’ calculations. 
 
 
Overall, the number of registered EAs fell by an annual average of 3.4 per cent between 1976 
and 2013-2014, while those of unregistered EAs fell by 5.1 per cent. By 2013-2014, the number 
of registered EAs had fallen from its 1976 level of 205 to 56, a decline of some 73 per cent 
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while unregistered EAs fell from 309 to 41, a decline of 87 per cent. The combined reduction 
was from 514 to 97, or 81 per cent. The decline was attributable to mergers, closures and the 
CO deciding that the EA no longer fitted the statutory definition, with data on these immediate 
causes being available for 1983 and between 1985 and 2013-2014. These show that of the 160 
EAs removed from the lists, 126 (79 per cent) were either dissolved or no longer fitted the 
statutory definition, with 34 (21 per cent) merging. At the same time, only 44 EAs were added. 
 
As well as data on the number of registered and unregistered EAs, data on combined 
membership totals also exist (see Figure 2). As is the case with data on EA numbers, the 
‘pruning’ of trade associations lessened the accuracy of data for unregistered organisations in 
the late 1970s. However, given the steep decline in the volume of EAs, a trend of declining 
total membership was in place from the late 1980s. In 1979, 128,257 employers were members 
of registered EAs while 38,990 were members of unregistered organisations, a total of 167,247.  
 
By 2013-14, the number of employers who were members of registered EAs had dropped to 
68,196 (a decline of some 46 per cent), while 25,389 employers were members of unregistered 
bodies (a decline of some 35 per cent). The combined total of 93,585 employers was equivalent 
to a decline of some 44 per cent. This decline was less steep in percentage terms than that of 
EA numbers, with this difference explained by mergers which reduced the numbers of EAs but 
had less impact on combined membership. The average year on year percentage decline for 
registered and unregistered membership between 1979 and 2013-14 was some 1.8 per cent, 
although the 1980s saw some stability before decline accelerated from the early 1990s. 
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Figure 2: Combined membership totals for all EAs listed by the CO, 1976 to 2013-14 (a). 
 
Note:  
(a) NFU and Scottish NFU excluded. 
Source: CO annual reports (various editions), authors’ calculations. 
 
In relation to the largest EAs, the combined membership total for such organisations almost 
always accounted for over half of the total for all registered and unregistered EAs (excluding 
the two farming unions). Table 1 provides data on membership totals for the four largest 
organisations in 1980, before showing data over subsequent years for these bodies. It outlines 
how membership totals have generally declined.  
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Table 1: Subsequent membership totals for the largest EAs in 1980 (a-c). 
 
Notes: 
(a) NFU and Scottish NFU excluded. 
(b) No data available for the General Council of British Shipping (or successor organisations) after 1986. 
(c) No comparable data available for the National Federation of Building Trades Employers after 1991. 
Source: CO annual reports (various editions). 
 
All organisations recorded falls in their membership, with that experienced by the EEF linked 
to the end of collective bargaining as it was:  
 
The driver for the regional structure and the national structure and most of the 
employers […] were involved in one way or another in this process. Obviously [the end 
of bargaining] meant huge culture change and a shift around in strategy (Interview with 
EEF representative, 4.11.2014). 
 
EAs by industry 
 
Industries in which EAs were active can be identified through allocating a Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) code to each registered EA based on its name. In 1979, the largest 
proportions of EAs were active in manufacturing (50 per cent) and construction (9 per cent), 
while both public administration and wholesale and retail trade comprised 8 per cent. The 
overwhelming majority of EAs represented employers within a single industry, as multi-
industry organisations did not usually fit the CO’s definition of an EA. However, industry 
1980 1986 1991 2010-2011
Percentage 
change, 1980 to 
date of latest data
EEF 5,651 … … 2,302 -59
General Council of British 
Shipping (b)
219 145 … … -34
National Federation of Building 
Trades Employers (c )
10,193 … 7,871 … -23
Freight Transport Association 15,869 … … 14,245 -10
Number of members
EA
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proportions were different by 2013-2014, albeit with a far smaller number of EAs. In this year, 
the joint largest proportion of EAs were still those within manufacturing, but its share had more 
than halved to some 22 per cent, the same as held by construction. The next largest industry, 
as in 1979, was public administration (12 per cent).  
 
CO data on the membership of individual EAs are fragmented, but some analysis is possible 
based on, first; the 178 registered EAs where annual returns are available at the National 
Archives and, second; the 20 to 30 organisations identified as the largest EAs by the CO’s 
annual reports. In relation to the EAs for which National Archives data are available, these 
generally show a rapid decline in membership levels. Table 2 provides the median percentage 
membership change for EAs within manufacturing, construction and public administration, 
calculated from the start to the end of the 1976-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-1999/2000 periods. 
Limited data precludes analysis after 2000.  
 
Table 2: Median of membership changes by selected sector, 1976-1980, 1981-1990 and 1991-
2000 (a). 
 
Note: 
(a) … Limited data availability. 
Source: Annual returns, authors’ calculations. 
 
No of 
EAs at 
start
Median of 
membership 
changes (% )
No of 
EAs at 
start
Median of 
membership 
changes (% )
No of 
EAs at 
start
Median of 
membership 
changes (% )
Manufacturing 70 -2 53 -28 29 -19
Construction 8 2 11 -7 8 -8
Public administration 12 0 13 0 … …
Sector of activity
1976-1980 1991-1999/20001981-1990
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While membership of manufacturing EAs remained relatively static during the late 1970s, 
dropping by a median of 2 per cent between 1976 and 1980, many EAs in more traditional 
sectors such as textiles and shipbuilding merged or closed. Examples include the Medway Ship 
Repairers Association, the Mersey Ship Repairs Association, the Wire Rope Employers 
Association and the West Yorkshire and Lancashire Wool Textile Federation. Decline 
accelerated throughout much of the 1980s when median membership levels across the sector 
dropped by 28 per cent, with closures or mergers including the Society of British Printing Ink 
Manufacturers and the British Association of Lithographic Plate Manufacturers. Although 
median decline reduced in the 1990s, it still stood at 19 per cent over the decade. The dwindling 
number of manufacturing EAs generally saw further declines in their membership throughout 
the 1990s and beyond. Overall trends between 1976 and 2001 are clear with, for example, the 
membership of the British Printing Industries Federation declining from 3,522 employers in 
1976 to 2,342 in 2000-2001 while that of the Welsh Engineers and Founders Association fell 
from 44 employers in 1976 to 8 in 2000-2001.  
 
However, EAs within construction generally fared better than those in manufacturing. 
Collective bargaining through Joint Industry Boards (JIB) survives in parts of the industry 
while some EAs, unusually, retained a role in the large scale provision of training. For example, 
representatives of the Electrical Contractors Association (ECA) stated that: 
 
We’ve had apprenticeships for many, many years and since the JIB was formed in 1968. 
We have had established JIB apprentice training schemes bringing people through to 
the electrical standards and then moving on to forming the JTL which is a major training 
provider charity (Interview with ECA representative, 2.3.2015) 
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Median member totals within construction EAs saw a small overall increase throughout the 
later 1970s. While median membership did decrease throughout the 1980s and 1990s, these 
were relatively small in scale at, respectively, 7 and 8 per cent. This is reflected in the 
fluctuating fortunes of some of the largest construction EAs. For example, membership of the 
British Decorators Federation grew throughout the late 1970s and early to mid-1990s, rising 
from 2,649 employers in 1976 to 2,993 in 1986. Despite this growth, decline set in subsequently 
and membership reduced to 2,175 by 1999-2000. At the same time, membership of the 
Federation of Master Builders grew from 19,911 employers in 1976 to 20,328 in 1979. It then 
stayed static through the 1980s, reaching 20,905 in 1990 before declining to 14,280 in 1999-
2000. Overall, the major construction EAs generally remained in place, although some smaller 
organisations such as the Federation of Design and Engineering Contractors did close or merge.  
 
Finally, the relatively stable organisational landscape of the public sector meant that 
membership stayed remarkably static within the limited number of EAs for which data are 
available. Examples include the Mid-Southern Representative Provincial Organisation of 
Employers Local Authorities Services with 37 members in both 1976 and 1985 and the South 
Western Provincial Employers Organisation with 64 employer-members in 1978 and 65 in 
1988. Commenting on the stability of membership, a representative of the body representing 
Scottish local authorities (COSLA) noted that even when policy factors led to individual 
councils withdrawing their membership, the national collective pay bargaining role played by 
the organisation tended subsequently to draw members back to the organisation (Interview with 
COSLA representative, 20.6.2017). 
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 Factors impacting on EAs 
 
Structural economic change  
 
The international literature on collective employer action (e.g. Traxler, 2000) stresses how 
structural economic change impacted on collective employer action, although the extent to 
which this took place varies by country. To what extent did EAs in the UK reflect the 
contemporary economy or that of the past, and how did this representativeness change? Most 
of the period between 1976 and 2013-14 was characterised by decline in the proportion of the 
employed workforce working in manufacturing, offset by rises within the service sector. Figure 
3 traces the indexed number of EAs within manufacturing and services to the changes to the 
size of the UK workforce active in these sectors between 1978 and 2012-2013. 
 
Figure 3: EAs and employment, 1978 to 2012-2013 (a). 
 
Note: 
(a) Consistent Office for National Statistics (ONS) employee data not available before 1978. 
Source: ONS (Series JWR7, JWT8), CO, authors’ calculations. 
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While there is some correlation between the collapse in manufacturing employment and the 
declining number of manufacturing EAs, this does not explain the totality of the collapse across 
all EAs. While manufacturing employment was shrinking, service sector employment grew by 
some 60 per cent, but the number of registered service sector EAs fell from 68 in 1976 to 28 in 
2013-2014, a decline of 58 per cent that was primarily caused by mortality and not by mergers.  
 
Figure 4 analyses sectoral representativeness in more detail through comparing the proportion 
of workforce jobs within high level SIC codes against the proportion of EAs active in the same 
sectors in 1979 and 2013-2014. Positive figures show an over-representation. In 1979, over-
representation was concentrated within manufacturing (26 per cent), with lesser proportions 
also present within professional, scientific and technical activities (3 per cent) and construction 
(2 percent). By 2013-14, the most over-represented sectors were construction (17 per cent), 
manufacturing (15 per cent) and public administration (9 per cent).  
 
Figure 4: Share of UK workforce jobs and EA by SIC code, 1979 and 2013-2014 (a). 
 
Note: 
(a) SICs with no EAs in both 1979 and 2014-2015 excluded. 
Source: ONS (JWR series), CO, authors’ calculations. 
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At the same time, these indicators of representativeness can be compared to employment 
growth. Economic sectors that experienced the lowest growth over the period were more likely 
to be over-represented, as was the case for extractive and primary activities (SIC codes A and 
B), which declined by 28 and 82 per cent, as well as manufacturing (SIC code C), which 
declined by 62 per cent. Sectors with strong employment growth were more likely to be under-
represented. These comprised largely private sector services (SIC codes G to N, S), such as 
retail trade, accommodation and food as well as financial and insurance activities, with the total 
for these sectors increasing by some 55 per cent. The exception to this trend of over-
representation in declining sectors and under-representation in growing sectors was 
construction, which grew by some 6 per cent and was over-represented in terms of EA numbers. 
The small number of public sector EAs registered at the CO makes analysis of trends within 
this sector difficult with, for example, no health-related EAs listed. However, the 
representativeness levels of EAs in SIC code O (public administration and defence, social 
security) were relatively high, both in 1979 and in 2012-2014. In general, EAs were more likely 
to be concentrated in declining sectors, a pattern that remained broadly consistent between 
1979 and 2013-2014. 
 
Political agency 
 
The role of states as ‘midwives of institutional change’ (Baccaro and Howell, 2011) within 
employment relations across mature economies has long been recognised, with the post-1979 
transformation in the UK being a particularly striking example. To what extent did political 
agency after 1979 have a corrosive influence on EAs’ ability to continue in existence? Table 3 
provides data for the Prime Ministerial periods of the Callaghan (Labour), Thatcher/Major 
(Conservative), and Blair/Brown (Labour) governments. 
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Table 3: Change by period, 1976 to 2010 (a-b). 
 
Notes: 
(a) Calculated as difference between data at start and end dates divided by number of years. 
(b) Data on unregistered EAs less reliable between 1976 and 1979. 
Source: CO, authors’ calculations. 
 
By the mid-1970s, EAs were active within two sets of employment relations institutions. The 
first comprised collective bargaining institutions. These were largely voluntary before 1979 
and were governed by procedural rules agreed by the participants (Clegg, 1979). As a result, 
rules were not usually imposed by the state. While collective bargaining was evolving as multi-
employer bargaining was increasingly supplanted by company-level approaches, the role of 
EAs remained largely intact.  
 
EAs’ second role was the co-governance of state sponsored tripartite bodies that participated 
within aspects of economic governance (Vidal and Hauptmeier, 2014). These included the 
Wages Councils, responsible for setting industry-specific wages and conditions, as well as the 
National Economic Development Council and Industrial Training Boards. The former advised 
the government while the latter were neo-corporatist bodies that coordinated vocational 
training through imposing industry-wide levies and grant-aiding firm level training (Gospel 
and Edwards, 2012). The continuation of both institutional roles meant that numbers of 
registered EAs declined only slightly by an average of 1.7 per cent per year between 1976 and 
1979 as did their combined membership, which declined by 0.7 per cent per year over the same 
period.  
Nos. of EAs Membership Nos. of EAs Membership
Callaghan (Labour, 1976-1979) (b) -1.7% -0.7% … …
Thatcher/Major (1979 to 1997) -2.3% -0.7% -3.3% -0.6%
Blair/Brown (1997 to 2010) -2.8% -1.7% -3.9% -1.3%
Registered UnregisteredPeriodization
Average annual change (a)
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Relative institutional stability ended in 1979 as Conservative Governments pushed through a 
programme of change focused on strengthening private enterprise through reducing regulation, 
facilitating greater competition and restricting the direct economic role of the state. Wages and 
incomes policies were immediately abandoned as was the role of EAs in co-ordinating such 
policies. Once-powerful tripartite organisations were downgraded, with the wages councils 
losing powers in the 1980s before being abolished. The voluntary nature of collective 
bargaining meant that there was no need for the state to legislate in this area, but Margaret 
Thatcher’s governments were characterised by their ‘total aversion to collective bargaining and 
her aversion to national joint councils’ (Interview with British Ceramics Council 
representative, 20.11.2013), while the government informally pressurised the EEF in the late 
1980s to end the engineering collective agreement.  
 
The 1980s also saw a raft of measures aimed at reducing the discretionary power of trade unions 
and their memberships began to reduce (Howell, 2005). The decline of collective bodies to 
participate within, as well as unions to countervail against, coincided with an acceleration of 
decline within both the membership and number of EAs. The number of registered EAs fell by 
an average of 2.3 percent between 1979 and 1997 while the number of unregistered EAs fell 
by 3.3 per cent. However, EA membership remained relatively static during the 1980s before 
turning downward. This delay was in part caused by the survival of many joint agreements 
until the end of the 1980s, with this acting to temporarily retain employers’ incentive to join 
EAs. Finally, the Labour Government from 1997 largely accepted the evolving approach to 
collective employment relations (Baccaro and Howell, 2011). Indeed, the annual average rate 
of decline in the number of registered EAs increased, from 2.3 per cent between 1979 and 1997 
to 2.8 per cent between 1997 and 2010, as did the decline of unregistered EAs from 3.3 per 
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cent to 3.9 per cent. Rates of membership decline also accelerated across both categories. By 
2010, only 106 registered and unregistered EAs remained, a fraction of the 481 in 1979. 
 
The other trend within employment relations was the growing salience of individual workplace 
rights, described by a representative of the Northern Ireland Labour Relations Agency (LRA) 
as: 
 
The great trend from collective bargaining in the 1970s, strong trade unions, into more 
[of] this era of individual rights, explosion of individual rights, jurisdictions, the decline 
of the trade union movement and influence (Interview with LRA representative, 
4.6.2015).  
 
While the 1980s saw a general downgrading of provisions such as those relating to unfair 
dismissal, the 1990s saw a lessening of deregulatory trends often because of European 
Directives (Emmenegger, 2014). At the same time, individual workplace rights were 
strengthened, most notably through the Disability Discrimination Act 1995. After 1997, 
accession to the European Union’s Social Chapter caused regulatory strengthening with regard 
to the length of the working week and annual leave (Undy, 1999), as did the creation of the 
National Minimum Wage and enhanced access to employment tribunals. Further workplace 
rights were set out by the Work and Families Act 2006 (Dickens and Neal, 2006b) while 116 
pieces of legislation were merged into the Equality Act 2010, setting out an extensive series of 
workplace rights and duties. While such rights and duties provided new opportunities for 
employer collective action (Bowkett et al. 2017; Demougin et al., 2017), organisations 
responding solely to these opportunities instead of bargaining collectively did not meet the 
CO’s definition of EAs and were excluded from their data. 
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The decline of collective bargaining 
 
The decentralisation of bargaining is well established in the international literature as a key 
factor driving changing patterns of collective employer organisation. (e.g Traxler, 2000; 
Behrens and Traxler, 2004; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2004; Sheldon et. al. 2016), but to what 
extent was this the case in the UK? Although multi-employer bargaining was increasingly 
supplanted by company-level approaches in the mid-1970s, bargaining institutions as well as 
the linked role of EAs remained largely intact. For example, negotiations between unions and 
the British Ceramics Council (BCC) produced terms that were 
 
Very, one might almost say intrusive in terms of the impact it had on each [member] 
company […] not only wage rates but […] more and more sophisticated holiday, sick 
pay, the whole range of employment rights which the union managed to secure over the 
years, which eventually constituted the wage structure, that was the bible (Interview 
with BCC representative, 20.11.2013). 
 
However, bargaining reduced dramatically after 1979. Figure 5 outlines the indexed decline in 
collective bargaining within the private sector between 1984 and 2004, alongside indexed data 
on the number of EAs predominantly drawing their members from private sector employers. It 
demonstrates some similarities between the declines in the coverage of collective bargaining 
within the private sector and the number of EAs.  
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Figure 5: Private sector coverage of collective bargaining and EA numbers, 1984 to 2011 (a-
b). 
 
Notes: 
(a) Workplaces with 25 or more employees, and at least some employees’ pay determined by bargaining. 
(b) Equivalent WERS data not available for earlier years. 
Source: Marginson, 2015, 648; CO; authors’ calculations. 
 
The decline of bargaining was less marked within the public sector, where the percentage of 
workplaces with more than 25 employees with any collective bargaining fell from 99 per cent 
in 1984 to 82 per cent in 2004 and the percentage of employees covered by collective 
agreements fell from 95 per cent to 75 per cent (Brown et. al, 2009). As well as being relatively 
limited in volume, the reducing levels of public sector bargaining was mainly due to the 
replacement of bargaining with pay review bodies (White and Hatchett, 2003), another 
centralised collective method of pay determination in which EAs play a part.  
 
Collective bargaining has changed in UK public services since the 1970s, with central 
agreements increasingly taking the form of a framework that allows considerable autonomy to 
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individual employers over the terms of implementation. A representative of the Association of 
Colleges (AoC) described the agreement covering further education colleges in England as 
being: 
 
Negotiated annually with a view to making recommendations on pay. They’re non-
binding recommendations. So we don’t have national binding collective bargaining in 
further education or for further education colleges. (Interview with AoC representative, 
7.10.2015). 
 
Industry-level multi-employer bargaining has been retained, therefore, albeit with a more 
flexible form, and with it has been retained the incentive for employers to associate within EAs. 
A relatively small number of public sector EAs continued to exist, and the rate at which their 
incidence declined was lower than was the case for private sector EAs. 
 
Accounting for the decline of EAs 
 
The immediate cause of the decline in the number of EAs listed by the CO was the dissolution 
of such organisations, with this accounting for most loss. What caused this decline? We draw 
on the UK and international literature on employer collective action (e.g. Traxler, 2000; 
Behrens and Traxler 2004; Sheldon and Thornthwaite, 2004; Sheldon et. al. 2016; Howell, 
2005, Baccaro and Howell 2011) to identify three potential explanatory factors: structural 
changes within the economy, political agency and the decline of collective bargaining.  
 
First, to what extent does the collapse of traditional EAs simply reflect structural changes 
within the economy such as the decline of manufacturing? The percentage decline within 
manufacturing employment, caused by a combination of existing trends accentuated by 
government policy correlates with the declining number of manufacturing EAs. However, 
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rapidly rising employment in the service sectors was not reflected by an increasing volume of 
service sector EAs. Closer examination of SIC level trends shows little evidence of EAs 
becoming more divergent from the pattern of the economy as time passes, but neither is 
convergence taking place. Within manufacturing, the rapid decline of traditional industries 
such as shipbuilding and textiles meant that many EAs no longer had access to sufficient 
companies from which to attract membership. At the same time, structural change favouring 
services did not spur a growing volume of service sector EAs as the decline of collective labour 
market regulation meant that service sector companies did not need to associate within EAs. 
As a result, there is no relationship between service sector employment and EA numbers while 
the close relationship between manufacturing employment and EA numbers appears to be 
casual. 
 
Second, how influential were governments throughout the period? Given the voluntary nature 
of the bargaining system that surrounded the EAs, there was little or no legislation or policy 
actions aimed specifically at such bodies. Brown et al. (2009) judged that public policy and 
legal intervention probably played a second-order role in the decline of collective bargaining. 
There is, however, no doubt that the policies of Conservative Governments between 1979 and 
1997 played a pivotal role in terms of changing the environment in which EAs operated. 
Government policy throughout the 1980s and 1990s undermined the conditions and machinery 
that enabled collective approaches and by extension EAs, as the need of employers to associate 
within such organisations reduced. Crucially, the post 1997 Labour Government did not carry 
out a wholesale reversal of the trends within employment relations that had emerged since 
1979. The overall impact of government was thus to create an institutional environment less 
accommodating to EAs from 1979 onwards. 
 
27 
 
Third, how significant was the decline of collective bargaining after 1979? This decline was 
the crucial factor as it tended to eliminate the need for employers to act collectively within 
EAs. The majority of EAs registered at the CO were representative of private sector employers 
with a close correlation existing between the declining incidence of collective bargaining and 
the number of such EAs. The primary purpose of EAs was to represent their members within 
collective bargaining structures, with this motivating members to pay annual subscription 
charges. Given the central importance of bargaining to EAs, it is reasonable to propose a 
causative link between the decline of such structures and that of EAs, with this interpretation 
strongly reinforced by our qualitative interview data. Data are less robust in relation to the 
public sector given the far smaller number of such EAs registered at the CO, but the decline in 
their incidence was less than was the case for their private sector counterparts. While many 
private sector EAs closed after their national joint agreements ended, some survived. 
Throughout the 1980s and beyond, the increasing tendency of company level employment 
relations to be characterised by internal processes offered some EAs the opportunity to reshape 
their service offering to members around advisory and lobbying services.  
 
Recent developments in employer collective organisation 
 
Has collective employer organisation in the UK survived despite the collapse in EA numbers? 
Our interviewees suggested that employer collective action has transitioned away from 
collective bargaining of the type captured by CO data towards lobbying government and 
advising members on individual employment relationships. For example, a representative of 
the Building and Engineering Services Association (BESA) stated that: 
 
If you look back to the very early days, sort of 1904, the organisation [had] a very 
narrow, strong focus on the rates of pay and relationships with organised labour but that 
has clearly evolved into something which is actually something really quite different. 
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No organisation stays the same over 100 years do they? (Interview with BESA 
representative, 13.12.2013). 
 
However, the process of transition was not always smooth with many EAs, such as the 
Association of London Clearing Banks, closing after the collapse of their national joint 
agreement. EAs that survived were those that were able to diversify. The Engineering 
Employers’ Federation (EEF) was forced to carry out a process of ‘reinvention’ after the 
collapse of its agreement in 1989 and reoriented activity towards lobbying government and 
providing advisory services to members including representation at employment tribunals 
(Interview with EEF representative, 4.11.2014). The Chemical Industries Association (CIA) 
also remained active as a lobbyist and service provider long after collective bargaining largely 
disappeared from the sector (Interview with CIA representative, 6.6.2015). 
 
Opportunities for diversification were often linked to the growing volume of regulation 
increasing the legal risks faced by employers. Such risks enabled collective employer bodies 
to offer services other than bargaining to their members. These services included lobbying 
government to secure favourable changes in the law as well as mediating regulatory impact on 
member firms through advisory services. A representative of the British Ceramics Council 
(BCC) summarised the process of change as: 
 
Legislation was increasing on a broader front and therefore there were other reasons 
why it was important for employers to join the industry sector family, other than just 
wage agreements […] the raft of legislation both from the UK and mainland Europe is 
just huge, it covers every activity that manufacturers are engaged in whether its health 
and safety, environment (Interview with BCC representative, 20.11.2013). 
 
The EEF Northern Ireland (a separate organisation to the EEF in Britain) described the shift 
from collective to individual regulation as a ‘radical’ labour market change. This shift caused 
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its organisational foci to change from activities linked to collective bargaining towards advising 
employers on legal issues linked to individual contracts of employment (Interview with EEF 
NI representative, 3.6.2015). 
 
Even within the public sector where collective approaches remained common, two trends were 
apparent. The first was the changing nature of these approaches towards less prescriptive 
models, with a representative of the EA for Scottish local authorities (COSLA) stating that: 
 
Once upon a time [collective bargaining] was comprehensive. It’s less so now […] what 
had been a more centralised structure where all pay, holidays, conditions, pensions, all 
aspects of terms and conditions of service, were organised and negotiated through 
COSLA were now delegated to the 32 Unitary Councils who then would have 
responsibility themselves for much of what we call terms and conditions of service.  
What was retained at the centre was national collective bargaining, the sick pay scheme 
and pensions (Interview with COSLA representative, 20.6.2017). 
 
This dilution led to the second trend; a greater focus on service diversification with, for 
example, the Welsh Local Government Association (WLGA) offering an ‘advice and guidance 
service around employment law and terms and conditions issues. We run practitioner networks’ 
(Interview with WLGA representative, 14.8.2015).  
 
As a result, the decline of collective bargaining and EAs does not equate to a similar fall in all 
employer collective action, although longitudinal data exposing this shift does not exist and a 
full assessment of this process is beyond the scope of this article. However, recent literature 
(Gooberman et al, 2017c) has identified many employer collective bodies advising members 
on work and employment issues such as employment law, and lobbying governments on these 
issues. Examples of such organisations include; National Farmers Union Cymru, active in 
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setting minimum wages within the Welsh agricultural sector through the tripartite Agricultural 
Wages Board (Interview with NFU Cymru, 29.7.2017); the Retail Motor Industry Federation, 
an active lobbyist of the government on a range of issues including those linked to employment 
(Interview with RMIF representative, 20.6.2017), and; Scottish Engineering, active in lobbying 
government across issues including apprenticeships (Interview with Scottish Engineering 
21.6.2017). All of these organisations found that the volume of regulation and other 
interventions on employment and skill issues at devolved, national UK and European levels 
enabled them to survive as employer collective bodies. 
 
Conclusion  
 
This article uses data from the UK’s Certification Office to illustrate, for the first time in the 
literature, the scale of the declining incidence of EAs in the UK between 1976 and 2013-2014. 
The total number of such organisations declined by 81 per cent and their combined employer 
membership by 56 per cent. We conclude that EAs with their focus on collective bargaining 
were inadvertent victims of state-driven changes to the UK’s political economy. It was never 
the case that the state decided that EAs were over-mighty and were in need of containing, as 
happened with unions. Despite the declining number of EAs, the growing volume of legislation 
regulating individual employment relationships enabled collective employer organisation to 
continue, but in a different form. However, longitudinal data on this topic does not exist. While 
collecting data that highlights this trend across a representative sample of organisations will be 
very difficult, future research may address this issue.  
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